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Introduction: the military name game
Benjamin Lee Whorf claimed language ‘may be shaped by the world, but in turn 
shapes the world’. In his study of Hopi language, Whorf found that linguistic struc-
tures determine not only interpretations of the world but that they actually shape 
the physical, social, economic, political and symbolical world people live in. Because 
Hopi language does not have words comprising the concept of time, neither words 
for the future, nor for the past, it would be impossible for a Hopi Indian to under-
stand the western way of long-term planning. Neither would the Hopi be able to 
refer to the past. Activities are seen as preparations but they are not associated with 
a date on which a product or service should be ready and/or delivered. Probably 
the Hopi do not have a word for ‘deadline’. A Hopi Indian would not have the 
conceptual tools, i.e. he lacks the words to shape his life in western society, to make 
sense of it all, but the same goes for the Westerner who would find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to adapt to Hopi society. 
 If one does not understand a language and a culture and is not willing to learn, 
nor willing to listen, one will remain a stranger. An outsider. The renowned Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis that stemmed from the study among the Hopi is summarized 
adequately by David Thomson (2008, 115): ‘we dissect nature along lines laid down 
by our native language’. 
 Exactly this is brought to the military field by Sarah Boxer (2009) in an excel-
lent paper on ‘Manipulating Meaning: The Military Name Game’, which stipulates 
phenomena common to military all around the world: by name giving, one can 
transform a military operation from one realm into a different one, for example 
from the kinetic order of things (shooting, killing) to a political order and/or the 
symbolic order of ideology. The name ‘Desert Storm’ signifies the kinetic nature 
of the operation. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ would provide the wording that 
transforms a military operation into a political and symbolic order that promises 
both stable democracy and free enterprise. In short, to quote Andrea Van Dijk and 
Joseph Soeters (2008: 303), ‘language matters in the military’. 
 For the Dutch in Afghanistan the desired political reality, necessary to convince 
the constituency during times of elections, was to reconstruct Afghanistan. The 
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military operation in Afghanistan was legitimized by the rhetoric of helping the 
Afghans reconstruct their society, to assist the central government and to contrib-
ute to the stabilization of the nation (Brinkel et al., 2009). Intervention ideally 
should not provoke the local population for the Dutch did not come to occupy, did 
not come to conquer. The intervention should be de-escalating in character. The 
Dutch were to contribute to governance and safety, and therefore social patrols 
were asked for, provincial reconstruction teams should be doing their work outside 
of the safety of the compounds, contacts with the local population were desirable 
and these contacts should be friendly, culturally aware and culturally sensitive. As 
was to be expected from the Sapir and Whorf hypothesis and the Military Name 
Game, the training method for the soldiers was given a name that fitted the politi-
cal objective: ‘smile and wave’. The desired political reality, reconstruction and sta-
bilization, required renaming the military way of training into something friendly 
sounding, like smile and wave, to substitute other epithets like ‘shock and awe’ that 
were characteristic for the earlier American entry phase and was symbolic name 
giving for hunting down terrorists and scaring the hell out of anyone who even 
merely thought of being slightly critical of this enterprise. Training for the mission 
that was baptized International Security Assistance Force cannot go well if the 
mission was given another albeit terrifying name. General names for present day 
kind of missions vary from ‘reconstruction mission’ to ‘counterinsurgency mission’, 
from ‘3D operations’ (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) to ‘stabilization opera-
tions’. All of these soundbite terms may hold some truth in them, because words 
create their own reality.
 Smile and wave is the minimalist version of ‘talking to strangers, learning to 
listen’, an approach to training that was clearly intended to inculcate a non-violent 
attitude and friendly posture towards the local population, who were not the enemy, 
but the victims of a, so perceived, brutish Taliban regime. Talking to strangers and 
learning to listen is a strategy that goes further and that fits into the objective of 
winning hearts and minds. It is perceived the model for soldier behaviour in the 
Uruzgan province of Afghanistan where soldiers eventually patrolled not on foot 
but on mountain bikes. 
 Cultural awareness, as we already asserted, started by trying to teach soldiers to 
smile and wave. And the learning process was not easy because at the moment that 
the mission oriented training began acceptance was low. The documentary ‘Smile 
and Wave’ by Marieke Jongbloed (2003) intimately portrays an infantry platoon 
during training and on mission in Afghanistan. The third scene of the documen-
tary frames a classroom situation where the soldiers receive not only their rules of 
engagement but are also taught rules for behaviour. They are told that the brigade 
commander and higher up officially commands them to ‘smile and wave’. Clearly 
audible is the first gut reaction from one of the guys who swears ‘goddamned.’ The 
instructor explains that when they behave ‘too tightly and too sharp, the population 
will think that we are an occupational power.’ There is some laughter and mild dis-
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cussion because the soldiers fear they might not be taken seriously, but this initial 
resistance is broken by the persuading rationality of the instructor’s arguments. 
 The next scene is shot outdoors at the training facility ‘Het Harde’ in the Neth-
erlands. Learning by experience is the step by which theoretical knowledge, the 
concept of ‘smile and wave’, is to materialize into practice. Military exercises are 
powerful training tools. And during these exercises role players, often participants 
from earlier deployments handing over their experiences in a reenactment of these 
experiences, dress up as local Afghans to play according to some scenario. 
 The soldiers on patrol meet rioting Afghan civilians that are stoning a woman 
for some behaviour unbecoming (perhaps presumed adultery or ‘flirting’ in public?). 
The soldiers break up the crowd with an excess of violence telling the mob to ‘go 
away’. They use their firearms to push the locals away. The locals are protesting by 
making a lot of noise whilst the soldiers are pulling them away, dragging them over 
the street, whilst pointing the gun at the unarmed civilians. In the after-action 
debriefing, the role players step out of their character and comment to the soldiers 
‘well … I think this was quite a display of aggressiveness, one of the soldiers kicking 
me in the stomach! I think in the evaluation you will be told that this is not like it is 
intended to happen. If you act like this you will have a problem over there, because 
all of them will turn against you.’ From his perspective, if this had been real it could 
have escalated easily. The platoon commander adds meaning to the context as he 
explains that the soldiers actually meddled into the private affairs of an Afghan 
family, and the soldiers dealt with the family matters quite violently. 
 These soldiers were not really ‘talking to strangers’, they were beating them up! 
But they were in a training situation where they are supposed to ‘learn to listen’. 
And in this situation the sense of reality, as Anne Irwin (2005) points out, is a 
social construction. To be more precise, the soldiers were in the process of acquiring 
cultural sensitivity and cultural awareness. The objective of the training in 2002 did 
not go beyond ‘smile and wave’, whereas nowadays in the preparation for Uruzgan 
the discussion on the objective of such exercises ranges from cultural awareness, 
cultural literacy, cultural competence to cultural intelligence (Abbe, 2007; Selmeski, 
2007; Winslow, 2010). Using concepts like ‘smile and wave’ and ‘cultural awareness’ 
are important because language shapes the world in which the soldiers are active 
agents, doing their job in operations with alternate name giving.
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the manner in which Dutch soldiers acquire 
cultural awareness during preparation and how they put it to use during the execu-
tion of mission Uruzgan. The assumption is that the motivational factor is very 
much helpful to acquiring this awareness, whilst fear and anxiety is hampering 
learning processes. By analyzing the content of four documentaries, i.e. ‘Smile and 
Wave’, ‘0911 Zulu’, ‘Fokking Hell’ and ‘Dagboek van onze Helden’, paradigmatic exam-
ples of failures in listening behaviour, but also examples of learning behavior, suc-
cesses in acquiring cultural awareness and threats to becoming a cultural change 
agent are presented. The chapter ends by discussing the state of the art in training 
in the Netherlands and the possibilities for future improvement. 
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Cultural awareness
Some of the footage provides hilarious material and a good illustration of the 
importance of language. When on a traditional mission where interaction with the 
population is limited to kinetic contact, understanding the other is probably only 
relevant to information gatherers or psyops officers. But when a soldier is given the 
assignment to let nobody pass at a checkpoint because a military convoy must for 
safety reasons pass first, as was the case in the documentary Fokking Hell (Feijten, 
Stakelbeek and Ter Velde, 2010), it becomes ridiculous and embarrassing to watch 
the soldier trying to stop some and allowing others to pass. The shots alternate 
between the checkpoint and the studio where soldiers express feelings that go along 
with their cultural experiences:
[checkpoint] The Dutch soldier at the checkpoint stops a car that, according to 
the Afghan driver, is transporting someone who got ill. The driver asks to let him 
pass because ‘she is not doing well.’ The soldier does not give in, because it ‘won’t 
take long before the military vehicles have passed, we are almost done.’ 
[studio] To the interviewer a captain states ‘in retrospect it is always different than 
you had thought it to be, you cannot simulate reality in the Netherlands, … the 
way how to deal with the population, in reality it is different.’ 
[checkpoint] To the driver the soldier apologizes: ‘I am sorry for the problems, 
but I have to.’ The soldier at the checkpoint maneuvers all cars to the side of the 
road, clearing the road. 
[studio] Vice-admiral Borsboom confides in the documentary maker ‘no mat-
ter how well prepared you are, when you are over there, the complexity is much 
greater.’ A colonel remarks on the complexity of a strange culture ‘you are dealing 
with a Muslim country.’ A soldier expresses his own feelings of uncertainty by 
stating ‘the population is very unreliable, you never know what someone is hiding, 
however innocent their stories are. You never know if they are gonna hurt you, 
you never know’. 
[checkpoint] Then a car, a small transporter, arrives at the checkpoint with civil-
ian dressed locals, all armed to the teeth. They introduce themselves as police 
officers. Judging from their looks, they could easily be a band of bandits. They 
are heavily bearded, wear turbans, and lack identification papers, police insignia 
and uniforms. Even so, because they insist on being policemen, the soldier at the 
checkpoint lets this car, and only this car, pass. He is very clearly in doubt because 
there is no way to establish whether the bearded guys are lying. Probably they are 
because they know that pretending to be policemen will guarantee their passage 
at the checkpoint. ‘Sir … are you police?’ the soldier asks an Afghan senior citizen, 
who clearly is too old to be on active duty, and lets him pass. He knows he’s being 
fooled, but what is he to do? The soldiers lack the knowledge of language and do 
not know the cultural codes by which he could ascertain truth or lie. 
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Understanding starts with language, but reading the cultural code, in other words 
acquiring cultural literacy, is equally important for the military on mission. Under-
standing the words is one side of the coin, understanding how institutions (organ-
ized norms and values) work is the other side. In Smile and Wave ( Jongbloed, 2003) 
high ranking Dutch soldiers, amongst whom is a military legal advisor, visit a 
women’s prison and find out that one can be easily manoeuvred into a position 
where Western and Afghan values clash and where the urge to intervene becomes 
pressing and awkward.
 The woman’s prison does not look like a high-risk penitentiary installation, and 
has some feel of coziness because it is a community in itself, but to the foreign 
soldiers it all is dirty. The NCO jokes to the police general ‘we don’t need to see the 
restrooms.’ In one room, more than eight women are present and the same NCO is 
surprised at the children that also reside there. ‘What can a women have done, that 
she is here?’ he asks the young mother. She married, divorced and then remarried. 
Now, the first husband claims she never divorced him. She has to stay in prison for 
eight years. The NCO (who cannot hide his non verbally expressed surprise) ‘so the 
child will grow up in prison?’ All of the women seem to have had marital prob-
lems. One was mistreated and after filing a complaint she consequently was sent to 
prison herself. The police general explains that a woman can only remarry when her 
husband has repudiated her. 
 The NCO says that they want to show the footage to the Dutch viewers who are 
not familiar with these problems. He wants to persuade the women to present bold 
statements but instead the women are infuriated: ‘you can videotape this, but we 
need help now, tell them to let us out … we want our right, help us get out of here.’ 
Lt Colonel Roel Krimp asks the translator to say that ‘they are here because of the 
legal system in Afghanistan, … ISAF cannot easily interfere, but we can show the 
footage to the world to obtain political leverage.’ The Lieutenant Colonel saves the 
situation brought about by the overly empathic but not too diplomatic NCO. Not 
being familiar with gendered institutions, women’s place in Afghan society, and 
with the penal code that consolidates the gendered institutions, the Dutch military 
brought upon them a political discussion they got entrapped in.
 Maaike, a lieutenant in the Navy starring in Dagboek van onze Helden (2010, 
third broadcast of the series), makes part of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
Uruzgan, Camp Hadrian, as liason officer, and to get building projects started she 
regularly has meetings with local contractors. She is very much culturally aware, 
and especially so regarding gender issues. Maaike is always careful about the way 
she dresses. Whereas male colleagues might wear a T-shirt when it is warm, she 
will never display uncovered arms. She discusses projects, and also grants projects 
to contractors; therefore she has the power to reward people and is treated with 
the respect due to any military professional, male or female. Maaike first wondered 
‘how are they going to react to a female officer? I will have to be modest, not draw 
attention, because this is not normal procedure in this culture. … I always wear long 
sleeves …The Afghans think the Dutch female soldiers can stand up for them-
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selves. We sometimes are complimented with the fact that Dutch females are edu-
cated.’ The principle of reciprocity is at work during these meetings. The contractors 
of course want a project, and in turn they sometimes give safety information about, 
for example, Improvised Explosive Devices. 
 Being unfamiliar in ‘strange’ cultures can be a barrier in interacting with locals, 
not knowing the language, not knowing the institutional arrangements, but never-
theless one can be aware of the cultural context or at least try to be and gain respect 
by showing respect. 
Learning to listen: motivation and cultural 
inquisitiveness
From the content analysis of all the footage it appears that two factors are important 
in learning to listen. Both are related to attitude. Motivation determines whether 
or not people want to listen and have an open mind. Cultural inquisitiveness also 
seems related to the learning attitude, but can backfire when soldiers are overdoing 
it, when they are prying into other peoples’ lives. 
 In Dagboek van onze Helden (2010), political advisor Tom walks towards the Slo-
vakian guard who is responsible for security of the inner circle of the compound. 
He wants to inform them that the guard should let someone pass without search-
ing. According to the cultural advisor the Afghans are uncomfortable with body 
searches and find them humiliating. The cultural adviser has instructed him about 
these Afghan sensitivities. Only the visitor highest in rank is exempted from the 
normal routine. It seems a minor issue, but trust is won by giving trust and showing 
respect. And there is no security risk, because the soldiers can count on the Afghan 
honour system. Tom is professionally motivated to listen to and use the council of 
the cultural advisor, because it will further cooperation with the Afghans. 
 Motivation, wanting to listen, is important for learning behaviour. Lieuten-
ant Maaike, who starred in Dagboek van onze Helden also seems inquisitive in a 
positive way. She shows genuine interest in people. But one can also demonstrate 
exalted behaviour, and then over-the-top curiosity and inquisitiveness can become 
unhealthy. From the outside the behaviour looks like cultural curiosity and empa-
thy, while it is in fact an unbecoming interest in some cultural arrangements that 
is displayed. Etiquette and politesse dictate that one does not poke around in the 
paradoxes of these arrangements because they obviously are honour- and shame-
related. The hard questions lie with status issues or are in the domain of private 
lives. 
 Shaming images are derived from Smile and Wave in a conversation between 
corporal Maikel Tanger and ISAF interpreter Jumshed. Jongbloed (2003) frames the 
issue by a subtle build-up. She knows well that one can only learn about the other 
culture if one better understands one’s own culture. The spectator back in the Neth-
erlands is presented contrasting and stereotypical images of posters in the soldiers’ 
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quarters and pictures of Indian women at booksellers’ shops in Kabul. The pictures 
are all projections of male imagination. Western soldiers seem not so different from 
Afghan men. Cultures are different, but men generally have comparable appetites 
for the other sex. 
 Alternating shots. Footage of women in burkas walking the streets. The camera 
zooming in at feet wearing fashionable shoes. The camera is simulating the mas-
culine objectifying gaze as the camera ‘looks’ just like ‘our’ western male soldiers 
look at the feet of these women. The soldiers wonder what is underneath the blue 
garments and in a group discussion imagination runs wild. Soon the brilliant docu-
mentary maker Marijke Jongbloed has the boys talking about ‘jerking off ’ in the 
little privacy that a restroom has to offer. The soldiers are candid, but we can dis-
tinguish between those who are bragging and perhaps want to impress the female 
interviewer, and those who, although equally deprived sexually, feel embarrassed 
about the uncalled for frankness of the confessions. The documentary maker in fact 
repeats the message ‘boys will be boys’, be they Dutch or Afghans. 
 Back in the private quarters, Maikel Tanger asks the interpreter Jumshed if he 
already had sex with his fiancée. Jumshed: ‘of course not, because it is bad for her 
reputation.’ Maikel presses on: ‘you did not have sex with someone yet?’ Jumshed: 
‘I cannot say no! I am not a virgin …’ Maikel now identifies the paradox in Afghan 
society, because you cannot lose your virginity if women won’t have sex before mar-
riage. The answer is shockingly simple: ‘if you succeed in finding a girl that is a little 
bit lazy or not too smart, then the boys go there and trick them, like telling that 
it is healthy for her.’ Maikel concludes that Jumshed needs to become more world 
wise and gives him three porn movies free of charge: ‘as a present we give them to 
you and we hope that you will learn something of it.’ Jumshed claims he already 
knows, but Maikel insists. Jumshed confides that oral sex is out of the question 
in Afghanistan, but would like to watch the movies together with his friends. He 
rejects Maikel’s suggestion to privately masturbate using these movies as ‘jerking 
off is also forbidden in Afghanistan, but it happens a lot … Allah knows.’ 
 Maikel is astonished, but one of the other soldiers, Eggink, who originates from 
the Dutch Bible belt, stands by silently. Eggink probably understands Jumshed bet-
ter. At the end of the documentary we are witnesses to his marriage. A marriage out 
of responsibility. Coming from a Dutch religious family he cannot but marry the 
girl that he got pregnant nine months earlier. Many of his relatives wear traditional 
clothing, not much different from burkas or other Afghan attire. 
Constraints on cultural communication
Learning about ‘strange’ cultures is hampered by barriers like mindset, frustration 
and fear. Learning is facilitated under safe and secure conditions. When under 
threat or otherwise engaged in tense situations, the default human reaction is to 
fight or to fly. New learning experiences are blocked because people will fall back 
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on routines, drills and behaviour that will help them overcome stress and enlarge 
chances for survival.
 09:11 Zulu provides some striking examples of decreasing communicative effec-
tiveness during the operational mode. At five minutes from Camp Holland an 
IED facilitator, a person making bombs, lives in a farmhouse (Franke, 2007). The 
Dutch Special Forces have authorization to carry out a ‘hard knock operation’. It is 
going to be dangerous and the men are looking forward to being engaged in action. 
Armed to the teeth, the special forces pass the farm’s gate, and enter the mud house. 
They kick in one of the rooms that give entrance to the private quarters of the resi-
dents and search the house seemingly calmly and professionally until they arrive at 
the courtyard where they only encounter women of various ages and children. The 
soldiers are vigilant and sharp, not edgy, but they clearly have trouble to de-escalate 
when confronted with women who are unaware and surprised by this armed raid. 
The women try to cooperate but do not understand that the soldiers only want 
them to move in order to separate them from the men. One young woman flaps her 
arms like a bird because she thinks that the soldier wants her to do so. She misinter-
prets the sign language of the soldier who only gestured here to ‘come over this way.’ 
The soldier loses his patience and pulls her garment in order to direct her towards 
the desired location. It is not fear that makes the soldier communicate badly with 
the women, but they are in an operational mode and mindset, constantly aware of 
danger, acting the soldier part and unable to see the women as they are, ambushed, 
surprised and frightened, violated in their honour and homely privacy.
 In Dagboek van onze helden the Dutch unit in Uruzgan was affected emotion-
ally as a whole because of the death of two colleagues who were victims of an 
Improvised Explosive Device. The viewer witnesses the collective trauma from the 
beginning, as these series of documentaries was shot by embedded reporters. The 
soldiers were filmed up close giving a day-to-day account and therefore the view-
er emotionally identifies with the soldiers. We see the dead and wounded being 
brought to the infirmary, we are present at the memorial meeting being organized 
in Uruzgan and we experience the unit’s grief. Two weeks later the events do appear 
to affect the tactical level of operations. One of the marines, Remon, is ordered to 
arrest a local who is suspected to be one of the bomb layers. Remon is one of the 
Marines, 22 years of age and Uruzgan is his first mission. The Marines have rounded 
up several men in the village amongst whom was the insurgency leader of the area. 
In addition the Afghan National Army arrested the person who placed the bomb. 
The Marines are highly motivated. Remon remarks ‘we really wanted to catch these 
guys, we didn’t want to come back home empty handed.’ Grief over lost buddies 
motivated the marines, but not being allowed to revenge them also frustrated them: 
‘preferably I’d like to beat these guys up totally, but ehhh, this is not allowed because 
of the Rules of Engagement, so however sour, we have to stick to these rules.’ The 
marine felt restrained and unfulfilled in his appetite for revenge, but he and his 
buddies did manage to inhibited emotions and act professionally during the arrest. 
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One can, however, imagine that events like this result in destructive and morally 
undesirable behaviour. 
 Really scary situations did not make part of the footage under study. Even when 
under fire, as in 09.11 Zulu, the soldiers were not anxious or fearing for their lives. 
In 09.11 Zulu the soldiers experience not fear but the thrill of combat. The footage 
was more or less shocking to the audience in the Netherlands because the special 
forces were evidently euphoric during the fight which is an emotion that was until 
now seldom caught on celluloid by an embedded reporter (Franke, 2007). But the 
fear factor hampering communication is well studied and well known. Fear blocks 
out knowledge of the other, reduces contact between oneself and the other and 
leads to a spiral of ever more antagonistic stereotyping. The strategy for reversing 
the communication breakdown caused by fear is also well studied and in essence 
simple. The more one knows about the other, the less there is to fear. People do 
not fear each other when they have gained trust from personal contact. Informal 
contact does further understanding and is the social cement of institution building. 
The management strategy is straightforward: do not be a stranger! Listen! Talk!
Discussion: soldiers as cultural operators
Because language shapes the world, the cultural operator, i.e. the soldier, should 
be able to talk to strangers and should learn to listen. The analysis of footage from 
operations in Afghanistan clearly illustrates the need for cultural awareness, the 
pitfalls, and the barriers in communication. The footage clarifies the conditions for 
learning about culture which are positive when people are motivated and when they 
demonstrate healthy forms of curiosity. It also illuminated the ‘old school’ training 
in cultural awareness from before 2003 when training was limited to briefings tell-
ing soldiers to smile and wave and the ‘do’s and don’ts.’
 The training bureau that provided most of these briefings, the bureau Culturele 
Achtergronden en Information [cultural background and information] was not con-
tent with this situation and neither were mission commanders, who assigned cultur-
al anthropologist Jeffrey Schwertzel to organize a more elaborate two-day Cultural 
Awareness Training, using, amongst other strategies, role play in simulated environ-
ments like qualas and mock Afghan villages. The bureau Culturele Achtergronden en 
Information now provides these types of training at a commanders’ request during 
the Mission Oriented Training. But training is limited both in time and in content 
and does not extend beyond furthering cultural awareness. 
 Evaluation studies (Ooink, 2010) arrive at indecisive conclusions on the effec-
tiveness of this training. Measurements before and after deployment show a 
decrease in positive attitudes regarding the local population, but stressful events 
and the difference between Force Protection Teams and Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Team (who have more contact with the local population and show positive 
attitudes, whereas Force Protection Troops more often are engaged in fire fights) 
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explains this decrease. Whether or not the training is effective cannot be gauged by 
survey-based methodology, but the effect of training cannot but be modest regard-
ing the low intensity and short duration of the programme. One even needs to be 
careful that training does not affirm and reinforce preexisting negative attitudes and 
thereby negatively affect the military preparation for missions. Culture experts have 
identified two points of discussion: one regards the content and level of training, 
the other is related to the organization and the timeframe of training. 
 Regarding content and level of training, the discussion is about the degree of 
cultural proficiency soldiers need to acquire. Regularly four levels are distinguished 
(Selmeski, 2007; Ooink, 2010). Cultural literacy departs from understanding the 
own culture whilst being aware that other people will look at the world from a dif-
ferent perspective. Other cultures are regarded as different but equal. By knowing 
one’s own culture one is emphatically able to read other cultural codes. In contra-
distinction, cultural awareness specifically is based on factual knowledge of other 
cultures and learning to behave without breaching cultural codes. Cultural compe-
tences (sometimes cross cultural competences or 3C) are defined as ‘a set of cog-
nitive, behavioural, and affective/motivational components that enable individuals 
to adapt effectively in intercultural environments’ (Abbe, 2007). Dijk, Soeters and 
Ridder (2010) more specifically specify seven competencies: flexibility, openness, 
cultural empathy (sensitivity), emotional stability, and social initiative, respect and 
trust. One who is culturally competent not only reads and knows cultural codes, 
but also knows how to communicate effectively with people from different cultures. 
An operator that is culturally intelligent is able to individually adapt to an unfa-
miliar culture by collecting new cultural knowledge, by motivation and by adequate 
behaviour. 
 Only the psychologists Ng and Early claim that all soldiers should be proficient 
at this highest level, the level of being culturally intelligent and they also claim 
that this level should already be attained during initial phases of training ‘… it will 
enable effective cross-cultural learning in the multinational environment, i.e., they 
will have developed meta-cognitive and cognitive capabilities to learn fast during 
their mission’ (Ng and Early, 2007: 8). Most anthropologists (Selmeski, 2007; Abbe, 
2007), however, will find this claim overly ambitious and will modestly propagate 
acquiring cultural awareness as relevant for all soldiers, whereas they would deem 
it desirable to develop cultural competences at officer level, especially where it con-
cerns members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, CIMIC-officers, information 
operation officers and the like. Commanders, political advisors and cultural advisors 
are normally required to develop or to have cultural intelligence. 
 And all this leads to the second point of discussion that regards the organiza-
tion and timeframe of the training. If all soldiers should at least be culturally aware 
and savvy, training should not start at the last minute, just shortly in time before 
deployment. During mission oriented training many topics are important and often 
culture is considered the poor sister when it comes down to allocating time and 
recourses. Training should start during the initial phase to lay down general prin-
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ciples and to sharpen soldiers’ cognition and intuition. Learning psychology dic-
tates that learning at cognitive, affective and behavioural levels requires repetition. 
That is why during the initial phase of training cultural literacy should be acquired. 
Ooink (2010) recommends cultural awareness training during the pre-deployment 
phase. During the deployment phase the cultural advisor can coach the military, 
the commander should motivate his troops and recognize possible culture shock. 
Interactive e-learning with information on local culture could be posted on the net. 
After deployment lessons are learned, mission reviews and questionnaires should 
enhance knowledge and culturally proficient agency and understanding. Salmoni 
and Holmes-Eber (2008: 237-271) propagate a comparable organization of cultural 
learning in phases and levels. 
 Afghanistan and Uruzgan are associated with counter-insurgency operations. 
Winslow (2010) wonders how long the interest with counterinsurgency will sustain 
the opinion that cultural insights will also be relevant for future operations. Will 
cultural lessons learned soon be forgotten when conflicts are perhaps more kinetic 
in character? It is likely that culture will also remain highly relevant in future con-
flict, but Winslow’s words do put the use of cultural competences in perspective by 
looking through military lenses: ‘Just as Malinowski argued in the 1920s, practical 
men need cultural information to govern and improve the condition of the natives. 
Then the question arises as to what type of cultural knowledge they [the military] 
really need. Do they need to understand all aspects of anthropology? I would argue 
that they do not. And out of practical necessity soldiers are able to gather cultural 
knowledge when it is useful to their endeavor. … With some training and insight I 
believe that the military can in fact be culturally aware and recognize cultural intel-
ligence for what it is – Intel’ (Winslow, 2010: 19-20).
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